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Recent Decision:
Conviction Under
Discriminatory City Ordinance
Held "State Action"
The recent attempts by southern Negroes
to enforce through sit-in demonstrations the
rights granted them by the Civil War
amendments have resulted in a number of
arrests for criminal trespass. On May 27,
1963 the United States Supreme Court
rendered its first decision on the constitutionality of such arrests.
In the principal case, ten Negro boys and
.girls entered an S. H. Kress "dime" store in
South Carolina and seated themselves at the
lunch counter. The store manager promptly
called the police and closed the counter.
When the police arrived the manager asked
the defendants to leave because integrated
service was in violation of a Greenville City
ordinance requiring segregated eating facilities.' Upon their refusal, they were arrested
for trespassing and subsequently convicted.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the convictions.' The United States
Supreme Court, in reversing the convictions,
held that when a state agency, here the City

1"It shall be unlawful for any person owning,
managing or controlling any hotel, restaurant,
cafe, eating house, boarding house or similar establishment to furnish meals to white persons and
colored persons in the same room, or at the same
table, or at the same counter; provided, however,
that meals may be served to white persons and
colored persons in the same room where separate
facilities are furnished. Separate facilities shall be
interpreted to mean: (a) Separate eating utensils
and separate dishes for the serving of food, all of
which shall be distinctly marked by some appropriate color scheme or otherwise; (b) Separate
tables, counters or booths; (c) A distance of at
least thirty-five feet shall be maintained between
the area where white and colored persons are
served...."
2
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of Greenville, enacts an ordinance requiring
discrimination because of race, and the state
permits its criminal processes to be used in
a way which facilitates the bigotry of that
law, such court action is in violation of the
fourteenth amendment's "equal protection
clause" and the convictions are consequently unconstitutional. Peterson v. City
of Greenville, 83 Sup. Ct. 1119 (1963).
In Lombard v. Louisiana,"decided by the
Court on the same day, the facts were
similar to those in Peterson except that
rather than an ordinance requiring segregated facilities in restaurants, the Mayor
and the Superintendent of Police of New
Orleans had issued orders requiring the
continuance of segregated service. The
Court, alluding to its reasoning in Peterson,
likewise reversed the trespass convictions
involved and declared that a state cannot
do by official command what it cannot do
by ordinance or statute.
In 1875 pursuant to the authority granted
by the fourteenth amendment, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act 4 which declared
that all persons shall be entitled to equal
accommodations and privileges in inns,
public conveyances and places of public
amusement. A penalty was imposed upon
any individual denying a citizen such equal
accommodations. The statute was declared
unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases'
because it was not the corrective legislation
that the Supreme Court believed to be required in this area.6 The Court stated that
such legislation was of a direct and primary
nature in that it established rights rather
than protected them from state action. The
Court felt, moreover, that the Civil Rights
383 Sup. Ct. 1122 (1963).

4 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
GId. at 13-14.
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Act took immediate and absolute possession of the subject of equal rights and
displaced state legislation in the area, thus
giving the states no opportunity to effectuate the mandates of the fourteenth
amendment. 7 The Court, in addition, declared that the "equal protection clause" of
the fourteenth amendment inhibits "state
action" only." Merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful, is not proscribed by the fourteenth amendment. A
significant problem in the civil rights area,
therefore, has often centered around the
question: what is state action?
The Supreme Court, in an early opinion,
established that a state can only act by its
legislative, executive or its judicial authorities.' If the activity originates in a person
or agency identifiable as an instrumentality
of the state, such action will be deemed
"state action." It is the power reposed in a
7 Ibid.

In a vigorous dissent, the first Mr. Justice
John Marshall Harlan stated: "If the grant to
colored citizens of the United States of citizenship
in their respective States, imports exemption from
race discrimination, in their States, in respect of
such civil rights as belong to citizenship, then, to
hold that the amendment remits that right to the
States for their protection, primarily, and stays
the hands of the nation, until it is assailed by State
laws or State proceedings, is to adjudge that the
amendment, so far from enlarging the powers of
Congress ... not only curtails them, but reverses

the policy which the general government has pursued from its very organization. Such an interpretation of the amendment is a denial to Congress
of the power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce
one of its provisions." Id. at 52 (dissenting opinion).
s Id. at 17. "If there is any one purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment that is wholly outside the
realm of doubt, it is that the Amendment was
designed to bar States from denying to some
groups, on account of their race or color, any
rights, privileges, and opportunities accorded to
other groups." Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).
i) Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).

person by virtue of his position that declares
his acts to be those of the state, not simply
the specific authority that the state grants
to him. 10 The actions of the police, therefore, are the actions of the state for the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment even
when the police act contrary to state law. 1
A state may not command discrimination
by legislative or judicial action. It would
seem, then, that it cannot judicially enforce
private discriminatory practices. 12 One
commentator offered the following analysis:
State effectuation of private discrimination,
state encouragement of private discrimination, perhaps even state toleration of private discrimination, are possible grounds

for holding the State responsible for discrimination enforced by its courts. If the
State is responsible for the discrimination,
it is, generally, violating the equal protec3
tion clause.1

In the principal case, the petitioners'
main contention was that the state had
denied them the equal protection of the
laws. The Supreme Court, agreeing with
this contention, found that the decision to
exclude petitioners from the lunch counter
was made solely because they were
Negroes. Since the exclusion of Negroes
"I Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM.

L.

REV.

1083, 1086 (1960).

"The constitutional provision... must mean

that no agency of the State, or of the officers or
agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.... This must be so or the
constitutional prohibition has no meaning." Ex
parte Virginia, supra note 9, at 347. Accord,

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
" Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
12 Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and
Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE

L.J. 315, 364; see Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note
10.
1.3Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For A Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 486-87
(1962). (Emphasis added.)
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was based upon an ordinance of the City
of Greenville which is an agency of the
State of South Carolina, the Court declared
that the state "has thus effectively determined that a person owning, managing or
controlling an eating place is left with no
choice of his own but must segregate his
white and Negro patrons."' 1 The respondents contended that Kress would have excluded Negroes even if the ordinance had
not been enacted. The Court found this an
immaterial factor and concluded that the
convictions, nevertheless, effectively enforced the city ordinance.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, did not
agree with the majority that the mere
existence of an ordinance required a reversal of the convictions. He analyzed the
question to be whether the ordinance influenced the store owner in his decision
to discriminate. Recognizing the commonlaw right of a private restauranteur to conduct segregated facilities, he felt the majority opinion violated that right.'5 But he
agreed that the convictions should be reversed because the store manager testified
that he was influenced by the ordinance.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the
Lombard opinion, discussed property concepts and drew a distinction between purely
private property and property which, while
privately owned, is maintained to serve the
public." He stated that property coming
within the latter category, e.g., a restau-

Peterson v. City of Greenville, 83 Sup. Ct. 1119,
1121 (1963).
"FId. at 1134-35.
16Accord, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
wherein the Court stated: "The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens tip his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the ... constitutional
rights of those who use it." Id. at 506 (dictum).

rant, if licensed by a state would become state instrumentality.I T Segregation practiced in such an establishment, he maintained, would involve such "state action" as
is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. ' s
Where the executive or legislative
branch of any state or local government
announces that segregation must be practiced in quasi-public facilities, there now
seems to be no doubt that criminal trespass
convictions for sit-in demonstrations are in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The
question which then arises is whether,
absent a statute, a judgment for civil treapass is constitutional if the demonstrator
is refused service solely because of the store
owner's personal prejudice. Following the
reasoning of Mr. Justice Douglas in Lombard, the bringing of such an action in the
state courts would invalidate the judgment
on the grounds that the state has acted
through its judiciary.' 9 Furthermore, if the
establishment is licensed by the state, Justice Douglas would declare the refusal of
service to be state action since he regards
the act of licensing sufficient to support a
type of agency relationship between the
state and the licensee.
It can be argued, then, that a court
17 Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 Sup. Ct. 1122, 1130

(1963) (concurring opinion).
is Contrary to Justice Douglas' remarks, some
courts have held that the mere licensing of businesses or issuance of permits by the state does
not establish such a relationship with the state
which would render the licensee's action state
action. To that effect, see Williams v. Howard
Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir.
1959); Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club,
Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C.
455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
"1 Lombard v. Louisiana, supra note 17, at 1127-

28.
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cannot constitutionally award a judgment
to a store owner in a civil trespass action
against a sit-in demonstrator. As has been
illustrated, a determination in favor of the
plaintiff may be construed as a state acting
through its courts. There exists authority
2
for such a view, for in Shelley v. Kraemer 11
the Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of private discriminatory practices, in the form of a racially restrictive
covenant in a real estate contract, was state
action resulting in a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The Court has also
held that a state court could not constitutionally award money damages for the
violation of such a covenant since it would
be state action to enforce compliance with
the covenant. 2 1 It appears, therefore, that
the fourteenth amendment prevents a state
from enjorcing private discrimination where
the state itself could not legislate or require
such discrimination.
There are a number of complex legal
questions which arise from the principal
case. Heavy reliance on the Court's broad
concept of "state action" may logically lead
20

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

21

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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public school. These children grow up together, play together and often pray together;
when they become adults they will work
together, vote together, pay taxes together,
serve together in the armed forces of their
country, and, sadly enough, perhaps even
die together in that service. There seems to
be no sound and defensible reason why, by
some means or combination of means best

to a result whereby a state court's dismissal
of a complaint brought by a Negro constitutes state discrimination since the state
may thus be acting.-22 The most disturbing
question unanswered by the decision is
whether a court's inaction may be construed
2 3as "state action.
Another major area of concern is reflected in Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion in Lombard wherein he examined
the distinction betwen private and quasipublic property. It is difficult to draw a line
between these two areas. Furthermore, if
the protection of private property rights
is at issue, strong legal arguments and
traditions must be considered. These
arguments may be difficult to answer, even
by the most ardent integrationist.
The possibility that state inaction may be
deemed a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
"equal protection clause" is discussed in Lynch v.
United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); Asbury Park Press,
Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
23 For a profitable treatment of the interplay between state inaction and the fourteenth amendment, see Peters, Civil Rights and State NonAction, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 303, 314-2%
(1959); Note, Lunch Counter Demonstrations.
State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 47
VA. L. REV. 105 (1961).
22

left to the collective wisdom of Congress,
these children should not all share with at
least approximate equality in any federal
program claiming "To strengthen and improve educational quality and educational
opportunities in the Nation."
I am grateful to the Chairman and members of this Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony, and on
behalf of His Eminence, Cardinal Spellman,
I express his appreciation.

